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Appellants Chad Barnes and Jane Barnes (the “Barneses”), by and through their attorneys 
of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C., hereby submit Appellants’ Reply Brief.  For 
the sake of clarity and brevity, the Barneses will use terms as defined in Appellants’ Brief. 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
When water is available for diversion under a valid water right, and no water is diverted 
and used on a parcel for more than five years, the water right is forfeited.  A former property 
owner, who keeps irrigating other portions of his property as he did before selling off the non-
irrigated parcel, can assert a claim of right against the new owner of the former parcel after the 
parcel is sold to the new owner.  This case can be distilled down to this simple statement of law 
and facts.  However, Jackson’s five-page-long summary of the case suggests complication and 
nuance that is simply not present.  See Respondent’s Br. at 1-6.   
When Bloxham owned both the Jackson Property and the Barnes Property, water was 
available to him under a single water right and he irrigated the Barnes Property but not the Jackson 
Property.  This went on for more than five years from 2004, when the water right was decreed.  
This was done because Bloxham did not have an existing irrigation system to irrigate the Jackson 
Property, so he concentrated his available water supply on what would eventually become the 
Barnes Property.  The Jackson Property was purchased by Jackson in 2012.  After that sale, 
Bloxham’s status was that of a third party relative to the Jackson Property and his continued 
irrigation of the Barnes Property constitutes a claim of right that bars any resumption of use by 
Jackson.   
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Jackson’s contentions in opposition to a finding of water right forfeiture center on the 
availability of water, the automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code, and Bloxham’s status as a third 
party.  None of these contentions are persuasive.  Water was always available to irrigate the 
property owned by Bloxham, either (1) 40% of the water in Spring Creek always available for 
irrigation use, or (2) virtually 100% of the water in Spring Creek when water was not needed for 
irrigation purposes on the Barnes Property (e.g., such as when alfalfa was cut and drying on the 
Barnes Property) because there are only three water rights authorized for diversion of water from 
Spring Creek.  The period of nonuse on the Jackson Property effects a water right forfeiture.  The 
automatic stay does not prevent the operation of Idaho’s water right forfeiture statute.  And 
Bloxham cannot be anything but a third party after Jackson bought the Jackson Property.  This 
Court must reverse the District Court and declare the forfeiture of any water right appurtenant to 
the Jackson Property. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The standard of review in a matter such as this is well-established and largely agreed to by 
the parties.  However, Jackson takes it a step further, contending that, based on Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(a), “a District Court ‘may grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if 
the party has not filed its own motion with the court.’”  Respondent’s Br. at 13 (quoting Harwood 
v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677, 39 P.3d 612, 617 (2001)) (further citations omitted).  However, 
Harwood and the rest of the precedent cited by Jackson ultimately go back to the former wording 
of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) that once provided that summary judgment, “when 
appropriate, may by rendered for or against any party to the action.”  Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
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56(c) (2015).  But since July 1, 2016, Rule 56 has not contained this provision, instead stating that 
“[t]he court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 56(a) (emphasis added).  Since the 2016 rule change, there is no basis for the entry 
of summary judgment in favor of a non-moving party.  On that basis alone, this Court may reverse 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Jackson, the non-moving party. 
III. ARGUMENT. 
In analyzing water right forfeiture, past cases from Idaho courts engage in a three-part 
analysis: (A) whether there was nonuse for at least five consecutive years, Idaho Code § 42-222(2); 
(B) whether any applicable exception or defense to forfeiture applies, Idaho Code § 42-223; and 
(C) whether use of the water right was resumed before a third party had made a claim of right to 
the forfeited water, Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 842, 70 P.3d 
669, 680 (2003).  Here, Jackson’s brief lacks adequate discussion of the actual forfeiture analysis.  
Jackson provides two arguments why 14032 has not been forfeited: “because all water available 
to [10420] was put to beneficial use” and the “automatic stay [] of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code tolled [the] statutory period of forfeiture.”  Respondent’s Br. at 14, 23 (capitalization 
modified, emphasis omitted)).  However, Jackson does not explain where those arguments fit in 
the forfeiture analysis.  While Jackson’s brief does not cite Idaho Code §42-223(6)—the only 
statutory basis he has ever asserted as a defense to forfeiture, R. at 194—these arguments must fit 
in the second part of the forfeiture analysis, although they are not availing. 
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Forfeiture is a necessary doctrine to extinguish unused, relic water rights and facilitate the 
maximum beneficial use of water in this State, where water is a scarce and precious resource.  
Jackson gives three core reasons for this Court to hollow out the forfeiture doctrine and affirm the 
District Court, claiming that forfeiture has never been measured “by examining how the water was 
applied to the land,” that water rights cannot be “forfeited when there was not enough water to 
fulfill the right,” and that the parent water right at issue here was “always fully put to beneficial 
use.”  Respondent’s Br. at 2.  However, none of these positions are valid reasons to eviscerate 
Idaho’s forfeiture laws as Jackson proposes.  First, forfeiture is defined by the failure to put water 
to beneficial use, which (for an agricultural irrigation water right, as is at issue here) is measured 
by the number of acres actually irrigated.  Second, where the Jackson Property was always entitled 
to 40% of the water available because of its shared priority date with the Barnes Property water 
right,1 there was always some water available for use thereon—certainly at least one time over a 
five-year period,2 which would stave off any forfeiture and reset the forfeiture clock.  Third, what 
Jackson calls the full use of a water right to irrigate just a portion of the authorized irrigated acres3 
                                                 
1  It is noteworthy that Jackson appears to attack this proposition at one point, Respondent’s Br. at 18, yet relies on 
it later when it is to his benefit, Respondent’s Br. at 3, 26 (claiming that he fully resumed use of 14032 in 2013 
by using 40% of the available water, which was his proportional entitlement).  These contradictory arguments 
demonstrate the flaw in Jackson’s position and are discussed further below. 
 
 
2  The certainty of this statement comes from the fact that the source of Spring Creek (the common source of all the 
water rights at issues in this case) is not mountain runoff (which increases and decreases) but a spring (which 
provides a more regular flow of water).  R. at 59 (describing the “spring that feeds Spring Creek”); R. at 61 
(same); R. at 176-77(Jackson’s deposition, p. 116, l. 20–p. 117, l. 3, where Jackson describes the flows of Spring 
Creek a consistent, noting that “you can’t see a difference in it, spring, fall, year to year.  It has not changed in 
five years”). 
 
3  Jackson’s focus on the place of use element of a water right, and distinguishing it from the other elements, 
Respondent’s Br. at 14-16, is inapposite.  A water right may have an authorized place of use that includes a certain 
number of acres, yet it may only allow the irrigation of some of those acres.   
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would subvert the entire concept of the duty of water and IDAPA 37.03.02.35.03.a., unless (partial) 
forfeiture applies—and Sagewillow makes clear that it does.  None of these over-arching reasons 
are availing, nor are Jackson’s arguments, all of which depart from the proper forfeiture analysis.   
Applying the forfeiture analysis to the facts of this case demonstrates that 29-14032, the 
water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property, has been forfeited by: (A) nonuse for more than 
five years, meaning the failure to apply any of the water to beneficial use on the Jackson Property; 
(B) the lack of any applicable exception that extends the five year forfeiture period; and 
(C) Bloxham, by irrigating the Barnes Property continuously, made a claim of right that the 
Barneses may assert on the forfeited water before Jackson resumed any use or, alternatively, this 
action was instituted before Jackson fully resumed his use of the water right, and there are fact 
issues surrounding how much of Jackson’s water right has been forfeited.  Bloxham’s bankruptcy 
does not complicate the forfeiture analysis, but only introduces one more fact by causing the split 
of 29-10420 (the parent right) into multiple water rights with identical priority dates and by 
alienating Bloxham from the Jackson Property (thereafter making him a third party relative to the 
Jackson Property and its appurtenant water right, 29-14032).  Every forfeiture decision is “highly 
fact driven and [will] sometimes have unintended or unfortunate consequences.”  American Falls 
Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440 (2007).  
The unique facts of this case do not affect the forfeiture analysis itself, nor do they provide any 
basis for the entry of summary judgment on Jackson’s behalf.  The District Court erred in doing 
so and, therefore, must be reversed by this Court.  
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A. Jackson’s water right, 29-14032, has been forfeited because it has not been applied to the 
beneficial use for which it was appropriated for at least five consecutive years. 
The starting point of any forfeiture analysis must begin with Idaho Code § 42-222(2).  
Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 62, 831 P.2d 527, 530 (1992) (“Forfeiture of water rights are 
governed by I.C. § 42-222(2)”).  That statutes provides: 
All rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall 
be lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to apply 
it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated and when any right 
to the use of water shall be lost through nonuse or forfeiture such rights to 
such water shall revert to the state and be again subject to appropriation 
under this chapter. 
Idaho Code § 42-222(2) (emphasis added).  This “doctrine of forfeiture is predicated upon a 
statutory declaration that all rights to use water may be lost where an appropriator failure to make 
beneficial use of the water for a statutory period regardless of the intent of the appropriator.”  
Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 738, 552 P.2d 1220, 1223 (1976) (citations omitted).   
Both the District Court and Jackson have repeated that it is the diversion of water, not the 
irrigation of land, that must be considered in forfeiture.  See R. at 356.  However, upon a plain 
reading of the applicable statute, it is the beneficial use of the water diverted under the water 
right that must be considered.  Idaho Code § 42-222(2).  Jackson points out that beneficial use 
“refer[s] to the way water is being used” and not “to the separate element[s] of a water right.”  
Respondent’s Br. at 16.  However, under Idaho forfeiture law, this is not at all helpful.  A water 
right is defined by a number of elements that define the parameters of the water right, none of 
which exclusively describes the beneficial use of the right.  Beneficial use depends on several 
elements of the water right including the purpose of use, the place of use, and the authorized 
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amount of use (e.g., volume limitations and authorized acres of an irrigation right such as those at 
issue here).  Once water is diverted pursuant to a water right, it is the failure to apply the diverted 
water to a beneficial use that effects a forfeiture.  Dovel, 122 Idaho at 62, 831 P.2d at 530.  And 
the failure to apply the diverted water to full beneficial use, at least once every five years, effects 
a partial forfeiture.  Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. 
Jackson admits that “water rights are appurtenant to the land.”  Respondent’s Br. at 20.  
Nevertheless, while articulating this correct statement of the law, Jackson does not appear to 
appreciate what that means.  By its application to beneficial use on land, a “water right becomes 
an appurtenance to such land.”  Koon v. Empey, 40 Idaho 6, ___, 231 P. 1097, 1099 (1924) (citation 
omitted).  For almost a century, “there [has been] no question that a water right becomes 
appurtenant to the land to which it has been applied and upon which the water has been used 
for irrigation.”  Id., at __, 231 P. at 1098 (citation omitted, emphasis added).  An appurtenance is 
“[s]omething that belongs or is attached to something else.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 118 
(9th ed. 2009).  An agricultural irrigation water right is appurtenant (or attached) to the irrigated 
acres on which it may be used.  A useful metaphor is considering the land as a table and the water 
right as a tablecloth.  If a portion of the water right is not used for five (or more) years on one 
corner of the property, it is as though the table cloth is removed from that portion of the table.  
When that portion is conveyed, the purchaser gains the table (the land), but it is not covered by a 
tablecloth (the water right).  Even though the analysis must consider defenses, resumption of use, 
and claims of right, this analogy aptly describes what it means for a water right to be an 
appurtenance to land.    
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In his arguments to this Court, Jackson confuses the forfeiture issue by parading a host of 
terms that have no applicability to this proceeding, for example: waste (Respondent’s Br. at 19), 
consumptive use (Respondent’s Br. at 16-17), and a hyperbolic overstatement that the Barneses 
proposes a “forfeiture rule … requiring [water users] to spread all their water evenly among the 
entire acreage assigned as their place of use, regardless of whether this distribution of water secures 
maximum use and benefit of water resources,” Respondent’s Br. at 18.  We will address each of 
these in turn. 
No one wasted water in this case, nor has it been alleged to have occurred.4   
Second, consumptive use plays absolutely no role in the Barneses’ forfeiture argument.  
Consumptive use is not even considered an element of a water right.  See Idaho Code § 42-202B(1) 
(“Consumptive use is not an element of a water right”).  Jackson’s claim that “landowners are free 
to change their consumptive use within their place of use,” Respondent’s Br. at 17, is generally 
correct, but in the context of a forfeiture analysis, such an argument implies that a landowner can 
engage in no irrigation (resulting in no consumptive use of water) and be shielded from forfeiture.  
This argument is entirely misplaced.  The relevant point is that a landowner cannot fail to make 
beneficial use of a water right, leaving a portion unused (i.e., non-irrigated for an agricultural 
                                                 
4  While waste has never been alleged by the Barneses in this matter, the Barneses made brief mention of waste to 
point out that allowing the concentration of a water right by a water user, which is the logical conclusion of the 
District Court’s determination in this case, would facilitate waste.  See Appellants’ Br. at 19.  Facilitating waste 
runs counter to Idaho water law policy.  State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 735, 947 
P.2d 400, 408 (1997).  Further, allowing a water user to unilaterally concentrate water overthrows the notions of 
the duty of water and subverts IDWR’s role in administering water rights.  See, e.g., IDAPA 37.03.02.35.03.a. 
(“For irrigation purposes, the duty of water shall not exceed five (5) acre feet of stored water for each acre of land 
to be irrigated or more than one (1) cubic foot per second for each fifty (50) acres of land to be irrigated unless it 
can be shown to the satisfaction of the Director that a greater amount is necessary” (emphasis added)).     
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irrigation water right) for at least five consecutive years, without facing the consequence of 
forfeiture, which is admittedly a harsh doctrine, but a valid and necessary doctrine in Idaho 
nonetheless because of Idaho’s arid climate and well-established policy to make maximum 
beneficial use of its water resources. 
Finally, Jackson again argues against the Barneses’ articulation of irrigated acres as the 
measure of beneficial use as an expansion of the forfeiture doctrine.  Jackson argues that any time 
there is not enough water available for diversion of the full amount due under a water right, rights 
are either forfeited or a user must always irrigate all of their authorized acres.  Respondent’s Br. at 
18.  However, the Barneses’ position is supported by Idaho law and arguments against it ignore 
the forfeiture statutes and cases adopting partial forfeiture in Idaho.  A water right, or a portion of 
a water right, must not be exercised for five years in order for it to be forfeited, meaning water is 
not applied to beneficial use under the water right for five years even though water is available for 
diversion and use.  Idaho Code § 42-222(2).  A water user can establish a rotation to irrigate his 
property that will stave off forfeiture indefinitely.  Going back to the table and tablecloth analogy; 
nothing is forfeited if a different portion of the tablecloth is used each night.  It is only when the 
same place is exclusively used (and other portions go unused) for an extended period of time that 
partial forfeiture steps in.  See Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680.  Again, the Barneses 
are not trying to persuade this Court to adopt new law here because forfeiture law is well-
established—pursuant to Idaho Code § 42-222(2), “an appropriator who fails to apply the water 
right beneficially for a period of five (5) consecutive years loses all rights to use such water, 
regardless of intent.”  Dovel, 122 Idaho at 62, 831 P.2d at 530 (citations omitted).   
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF—PAGE 10 
And it is the same with partial forfeiture of a water right.  The Idaho Supreme Court, in 
affording deference to IDWR, has determined that “partial forfeiture is provided for by I.C. § 42-
222(2).”  State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 735, 947 P.2d 400, 408 
(1997).  In other words, the part of a water right appurtenant to any portion of property is forfeited, 
regardless of intent, when the water right is not beneficially used on that portion.  See Id.; see also 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (describing “a partial forfeiture of water rights by 
nonuse for five years” and the corollary that any “resumption of use must also be upon land to 
which the water right is appurtenant” (citations omitted)).   
Here, there is absolutely no dispute that 29-10420 (the parent right) was not used on the 
Jackson Property for five or more consecutive years after 29-10420 was decreed in 2004.  First, 
Jackson presented no evidence of irrigation on the property from 2004 through 2009—indeed, 
Jackson did not even view the property until 2011.  The Barneses’ affirmative assertion of 
forfeiture is fully supported by Bloxham’s testimony, paired with the confirmation of Roy Calvin 
Henderson (the adjacent landowner to the Jackson Property), regarding the timeframe from 2004-
2009—which is not controverted by Jackson—provides clear and convincing evidence of the five-
year-long forfeiture period.  R. at 60-61, 139-40.  Jackson’s lack of evidence of irrigation, and 
the Barneses’ affirmative evidence of non-irrigation, is sufficient to satisfy the first part of 
the forfeiture analysis.  Issues relating to exceptions or defenses (such as circumstances beyond 
the water users control and the availability of water argument made by Jackson) are addressed in 
the second part of the analysis.  See Section III.B., infra.  Further, any issues of resumption (i.e., 
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any use of water on the Jackson property after 2009) and claims of right are assessed in the third 
part of the analysis.  See Section III.C., infra.   
B. No exceptions or defenses apply to prevent the forfeiture of 29-14032. 
There are certain defenses that can stop, or toll, the forfeiture clock.  See Idaho Code § 42-
223.  These defenses only apply to the forfeiture period itself, which in this case is the period 
spanning 2004–2009.  However, these defenses are not applicable to an attempted resumption of 
use or any time after the five-year forfeiture period has already run.   
In the course of discovery in this case, the Barneses asked Jackson to “identify which 
exemptions provided in Idaho Code § 42-223 and common law you claim exempt 29-14032 from 
forfeiture.”  R. at 194.  The only defense ever disclosed by Jackson is Idaho Code § 42-223(6).  R. 
at 194.  That statute provides: 
No portion of any water right shall be lost or forfeited for nonuse if the 
nonuse results from circumstances over which the water right owner has no 
control. Whether the water right owner has control over nonuse of water 
shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Idaho Code § 42-223(6).  In other words, if—during the five consecutive years of nonuse (here, 
from 2004 to 2009)—the nonuse is caused by “circumstances over which the water right owner 
has no control,” the forfeiture period is tolled.  Id.  Jackson disclosed only two bases for the 
application of this defense: (1) Bloxham’s bankruptcy and (2) interference by Bloxham occurring 
in 2012.  R. at 194.  Jackson has abandoned the second basis, as it occurred in 2012 and, 
consequently, has no applicability to the period of nonuse in this case, 2004-2009.  However, 
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Jackson has, without supplementing his discovery responses, belatedly raised5 another basis to 
apply § 42-223(6): that Bloxham used all of the water available to him.  Respondent’s Br. at 18.  
None of these circumstances warrant application of Idaho Code § 42-223(6) to prevent the 
forfeiture of 29-14032. 
1. The facts and legal consequences of Bloxham’s bankruptcy have no legal impact on 
Jackson’s interest in 29-14032.  
In these proceedings, Jackson again contends that the automatic stay of bankruptcy, 
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), somehow prevents the forfeiture of 29-14032, the water right (or 
portion of the parent right, 29-10420) appurtenant to the Jackson Property, by tolling the operation 
of Idaho Code § 42-222(2).  Respondent’s Br. at 2 (“the Idaho forfeiture statute was tolled while 
the property in question was in bankruptcy”).  The Barneses have previously dedicated significant 
effort to four arguments addressing Jackson’s contention, which are incorporated herein by 
reference.  R. at 326-41; see also Appellants’ Br. at 24-29.   
Against these arguments, Jackson cites authorities to support the (uncontested) proposition 
that the automatic stay “is extremely broad in scope.”  Respondent’s Br. at 24 (quoting Delpit v. 
Comm’r, 18 F.3d 768, 770 (9th Cir. 1994)).  However, in addressing each of the Barneses’ four 
arguments against the contention that the automatic stay applies as Jackson believes, Jackson cites 
absolutely no authority of any kind beyond quoting some of the statutory provisions that form 
the basis of the Barneses’ four arguments.  See Respondent’s Br. at 24-25.  By rule, a respondent’s 
brief “shall contain the contentions of the respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal, 
                                                 
5  Again, the Barneses invite this Court to apply Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(3) and exclude this extra basis 
asserted by Jackson to apparently apply Idaho Code § 42-223(6).  See Appellants’ Br. at 23-24, n. 6. 
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the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record 
relied upon.”  Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(6).  This is the same rule for both appellants and 
respondents.  See Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6); compare Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(6); see also 
Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 90, 996 P.2d 303, 309 (2000).  By 
failing to provide any citation to authority, the issue is waived.  Shea v. Kevic Corp., 156 Idaho 
540, 548, 328 P.3d 520, 528 (2014); Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790-91, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152-
53 (2010).  Thus, Jackson has waived any challenge to the four arguments provided by the 
Barneses against the application of the automatic stay to prevent the forfeiture of 29-14032. 
Nevertheless, even considered on their merits, Jackson’s positions cannot be availing.  The 
facts of Bloxham’s bankruptcy merit discussion, and while involved, they are not overly-
complicated.  He apparently believed he had transferred any interest he had in the Jackson Property 
(and other property) to either Eagle Eyes, Ltd. or the Bloxham family trust.  Respondent’s Br. at 
7-9.  Despite filing bankruptcy on October 12, 2005, the status of the Jackson Property was not 
settled until 2012, whereupon the bankruptcy trustee quickly sold the Jackson Property to Jackson.  
R. at 271-74, 281-83.  The District Court was faced with Jackson’s argument regarding the 
automatic stay and correctly found that “the Bankruptcy [sic] proceedings, and any stay associated 
with such, are not related to this litigation and therefore will not be discussed.”  R. at 360.  For the 
same four reasons presented by the Barneses to the District Court, this Court should also find 
Bloxham’s bankruptcy and the automatic stay not applicable to this matter. 
First, the automatic stay only prevents affirmative actions affecting the bankruptcy estate.  
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (barring “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate” (emphasis 
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added)); see also H.R. Rep. 95-595, 340-41, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297-98 (stating 
Congress’s intention that 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) would stay “[a]ll proceedings … including 
arbitration, license revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings … [including] civil 
actions … and all proceedings even if they are not before governmental tribunals” (emphasis 
added)).  “The mere running of time on contractual rights is not an act of a creditor within the 
meaning of Section 362(a).”  In re Pridham, 31 B.R. 497, 499 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983); see also 
In re Petersen, 42 B.R. 39, 40 (Bankr. Or. 1984) (concluding that the passage of time, which 
extinguishes a right of redemption after a foreclosure is not within the scope of the automatic stay).  
Jackson, however, contends (without citation) that “[i]t is not the Idaho statute that is being stayed 
by federal bankruptcy law; it is Bloxham’s actions of alleged forfeiture that are being stayed.  
While the property was in bankruptcy, Bloxham was not entitled to take any actions that could 
affect the property value or disposition.”  Respondent’s Br. at 24.  This point is contradicted by 
Jackson himself within this same brief.  See Respondent’s Br. at 2 (“the Idaho forfeiture statute 
was tolled while the property in question was in bankruptcy”).  It is also nonsensical.  Bloxham’s 
“actions of alleged forfeiture” are his nonuse of the water right appurtenant to the Jackson 
Property.  The automatic stay prevents “any act” affecting the property in the bankruptcy estate, 
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), and not “any act or nonaction” or the passage of time.   
Second, the Bankruptcy Code contains a tolling statute—11 U.S.C. § 108—that is 
applicable to this situation, instead of the automatic stay.  This tolls the time for a bankruptcy 
trustee to “cure a default, or perform any other similar act.”  11 U.S.C. § 108(b).  It extends the 
time to the later of (1) the normal expiration of the timeframe or (2) sixty days “after the order for 
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relief.”  Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 301(b) (defining the “order for relief” described in option (2) as 
“[t]he commencement of a voluntary case” under the Bankruptcy Code).  Jackson contends that 
this does not apply because “[f]orfeiture of water rights is not curing default or a similar act.”  
Respondent’s Br. at 24.  However, curing a forfeiture (i.e., beneficially using a water right that is 
in the midst of the forfeiture period) is exactly an act meant to “cure a default, or perform any other 
similar act” that is addressed by 11 U.S.C. § 108(b).  Because the Bankruptcy Code is a cohesive 
scheme, “where one section of the Code explicitly governs an issue, another section should not be 
interpreted to cause an irreconcilable conflict.”  In re Liddle, 75 B.R. 41, 44 (Bankr. Mont. 1987) 
(citation omitted).  Thus, the tolling statute and not the automatic stay should apply to this matter.  
The effect of this is that, at latest, forfeiture was tolled to May 21, 2009 (60 days after March 22, 
2009, when the five year forfeiture period was completed from March 22, 2004, the day that 29-
10420 was decreed by the SRBA Court).  There is no evidence of any resumption of use of 29-
14032 by May 21, 2009, meaning that any § 42-223(6) defense based on the bankruptcy automatic 
stay is ineffective. 
Third, the automatic stay itself contains an exception to allowing the functioning of 
governmental action “to enforce such governmental unit’s or organization’s police and regulatory 
power.”  11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4).  To whatever extent the automatic stay of § 362(a) applies here, 
the action being stayed must be an action of the State of Idaho (via Idaho Code § 42-222(2)), which 
is allowed by § 362(b)(4).  The operation of the forfeiture statute is an exercise of the police and 
regulatory power of the State of Idaho, under any test imposed by the federal courts.  See R. at 
328-30.  However, Jackson contends that “[t]his statute does not on its face apply to this forfeiture 
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proceeding, which was not brought by any governmental unit.  It was brought by private parties, 
the Barneses.”  Respondent’s Br. at 25.  This confuses the issue and incorrectly equates this 
proceeding to declare the forfeiture of 29-14032 with the actions that caused that forfeiture under 
Idaho Code § 42-222(2).  The stay has no application to this proceeding because the Jackson 
Property is not in the bankruptcy estate any longer.  Jackson’s contention must be that the 
automatic stay somehow affected the operation of Idaho Code § 42-222(2) at some point between 
2004 and 2009.  Jackson’s contention that the automatic stay bars this action—instituted in 2014—
is misplaced.   
Finally, unless there is a direct and unavoidable conflict, the Bankruptcy Code cannot 
enlarge or create substantive property rights, which are defined by state law.  Butner v. U.S., 440 
U.S. 48, 55, 99 S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979).  Jackson contends that his position does 
not use the Bankruptcy Code to enlarge or create a substantive property right, but “prevents the 
property values from being manipulated through non-use of water rights or concentrated use of 
water rights to cause a forfeiture of valuable property rights.”  Respondent’s Br. at 25.  This 
prevention of changing property values or forfeiting property rights is a definitional example of 
enlarging or creating a substantive property right.  Idaho law provides for the forfeiture of a water 
right after five years of nonuse.  Idaho Code § 42-222(2).  The Bankruptcy Code can only affect 
that outcome to the extent explicitly required by its text.  For that reason, the automatic stay does 
not utterly prevent forfeiture of a water right for the duration of a bankruptcy case; instead, the 
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tolling statute, 11 U.S.C. § 108, provides the trustee or debtor-in-possession with sufficient time 
to take any actions6 to cure a pending water right forfeiture.   
Ultimately, Jackson contends that the purpose of the automatic stay is “to prevent the 
judgment debtor or anyone else from taking action that could affect the value of property to be 
distributed in bankruptcy.”  Respondent’s Br. at 25.  This is a repackaging of the “status quo” 
argument previously asserted by Jackson.  R. at 251-52.  This was incorrect when posed to the 
District Court and it remains incorrect now.  When faced with this kind of argument, the Eighth 
Circuit was not persuaded, stating: 
Even accepting the debtor's argument that § 362(a) is designed in part to 
preserve the status quo as of the date of the petition in bankruptcy, their 
right remains only to redeem the property within the period established 
by statute. To hold that § 362(a) operates as an automatic stay of the 
running of the statutory period of redemption would be to enlarge 
property rights created by state law, a result we view as unjustified by 
the language of § 362(a) and as unintended by Congress. 
Johnson v. First Nat. Bank of Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d 270, 277 (8th Cir. 1983) (emphasis 
added).  Jackson seeks an application of the automatic stay that is “unjustified by the language of 
§ 362(a) and [] unintended by Congress.”  Id.  For that reason, Bloxham’s bankruptcy does not 
prevent the forfeiture of 29-14032. 
                                                 
6  For instance, a trustee or debtor-in-possession could apply for an extension of the five-year forfeiture period.  
Idaho Code § 42-222(3)–(4).  A trustee or debtor-in-possession could also apply the water to beneficial use (either 
proportionately or by rotation, thus preventing forfeiture.   
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2. Water was always legally available (i.e., in priority) to the water right owner for 
application to beneficial use on the Jackson Property, thus its non-use effects a 
forfeiture.  
Jackson summarizes the Barneses’ position in this matter as asking “this Court to find that 
when a predecessor property owner indisputably does not have enough water for the entire 
property, and chooses to use all of his available water for only a portion of his land, he thereby 
forfeits his water rights for subsequent purchasers of the un-watered portion of land upon partition 
of the tract.”  Respondent’s Br. at 1.  This is a correct summary of partial forfeiture law in Idaho 
as applied to this matter, which is the basis of the position asserted by the Barneses in this matter.7  
However, there are important facts to consider when considering the application of partial 
forfeiture law to this matter. Specifically, the fact that the entire property—including the Jackson 
Property—was always entitled to the use of water, which is to say that approximately 40% of the 
water in Spring Creek was always legally available for Bloxham to beneficially use on the 
Jackson Property.  Additionally, it is also evident that virtually 100% of the water in Spring 
                                                 
7  The Barneses are not alone in understanding partial forfeiture this way.  Consider this example:  
 
For example, consider the situation where a farmer has a 4 cfs water right to irrigate 200 
acres, but then takes 50 acres out of irrigation for use as a processing facility, a housing 
development, or some other non-irrigated use. The “forfeiture clock” would begin running 
as to a portion of the water right. After five years, one-fourth of the water right, or 1 cfs, 
would be subject to a ruling that it had been forfeited. Such a result is hardly surprising, 
given that the foundational principles of the prior appropriation doctrine are beneficial use, 
the avoidance of waste, and maximum use of the resource. Of course, the farmer could 
avoid forfeiting this portion of the right by transferring it to some other use or placing it in 
a “water bank” or “rental pool” established pursuant to state law.  
 
Jeffrey C. Fereday et al., WATER LAW HANDBOOK 43 (Givens Pursley LLP, January 2, 2017) 
(http://www.givenspursley.com/assets/publications/handbooks/ handbook-waterlaw.pdf); see also R. at 323 
(providing this same example to the District Court). 
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Creek was available for the Jackson Property when water was not needed for irrigation purposes 
on the Barnes Property (e.g., such as when alfalfa was cut and drying on the Barnes Property).   
This fact is extremely significant and Jackson’s doubletalk first ignores it to assert that 
water was not available to be used on the Jackson Property, Respondent’s Br. at 18, just to later 
use this fact to claim that Jackson “resumed full use of water on [the Jackson Property] in April 
2013” by using “forty percent of the available water from Spring Creek” to irrigate some 10 acres 
of the Jackson Property.  Respondent’s Br. at 3, 26.  However, the inconsistent application of the 
law to the facts leads to an incorrect result.   
In Idaho, “an appropriator who fails to apply the water right beneficially for a period of 
five (5) consecutive years loses all rights to use such water, regardless of intent.”  Dovel, 122 
Idaho at 62, 831 P.2d at 530 (citations omitted, emphasis added).  It is the duty of this Court to 
“apply the statute as written.  If the statute is unwise, the power to correct it resides with the 
legislature, not the judiciary.”  A&B Irr. Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 154 Idaho 652, 656, 
301 P.3d 1270, 1274 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, “rights to the 
use of water … shall be lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to 
the beneficial use for which it was appropriated.”  Idaho Code § 42-222(2).  This Court has 
determined that “water rights cannot be forfeited by nonuse if the water was not available.”  
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 843, 70 P.3d at 681.   
Jackson seizes on this phrase and centers his argument on availability, echoing now-Justice 
Burdick’s analysis in Wood v. Troutt.  Respondent’s Br. at 17-18 (citing In re SRBA, Case No. 
39576, Subcase 65-05663B (Wood v. Troutt), Memorandum Decision and Order on Challenge; 
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and Order of Partial Decree, pp. 32-33 (dated May 9, 2002)).  However, this issue revolves around 
exactly what is meant by “availability.”  Jackson contends that when water is not available to fully 
satisfy a water right, it is legally impossible to forfeit any portion of that water right; it is the actual 
or physical availability of (all the) water that is determinative of nonuse.  Respondent’s Br. at 1.  
The Barneses argue that if a water right is in priority, the failure to put any portion of that water 
right to beneficial use for five consecutive years or more forfeits that portion; it is the legal 
availability of the water right that is determinative of nonuse.   
In resolving between these two proposed meanings of availability, the definitions are 
instructive.  In a legal sense, available means “[l]egally valid.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 155 
(9th ed. 2009).  This fits with the applicable standard definitions of available, which are:  “1 that 
one can avail oneself of; that can be used; usable” and “2 that can be gotten, had, or reached; 
handy; accessible.”  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 98 (5th ed. 2014) (bold 
emphasis in original).  Thus, when a water right is in priority, there is a legal entitlement to water.  
In other words, the water right is legally exercisable, and the water user can avail itself of the 
water, which is usable and can be gotten.  It is the legal availability of water that controls.   
This is supported by the context of the statement in Sagewillow.  In full, the paragraph 
relating to availability reads: 
Water rights are not forfeited because of the failure to use them for a period 
of five years if such failure is caused by circumstances beyond the control 
of the water right holder. Jenkins v. State, Department of Water Resources, 
103 Idaho 384, 647 P.2d 1256 (1982). The fourteen surface water rights 
appurtenant to the Knollin and Bird Ranches were later priority rights 
that could only be delivered during high water flows. Sagewillow raised 
the defense below that the evidence did not show water was available 
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during the years of nonuse. The Department did not make any finding on 
that issue. Because water rights cannot be forfeited by nonuse if the water 
was not available and Sagewillow raised that issue, the Department must 
find that water was available for Sagewillow's use before it can find that 
Sagewillow forfeited water rights by nonuse of the water. Therefore, on 
remand the Department can address this issue. 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 843, 70 P.3d at 681 (emphasis added).  In other words, the water rights 
in question were junior in priority to other water rights and could only be delivered during “high 
water flows,” making them unavailable (out of priority) under normal conditions.  Id.  Again, it is 
the legal availability of water that was significant to the Sagewillow Court.   
Despite this logic, Jackson ignores Sagewillow and other Idaho law and asserts that “[t]here 
is no case law in Idaho … to support the assertion that if a landowner does not have enough water 
to satisfy his entire water rights [sic], but he fully puts the water he gets to beneficial use, he has 
nonetheless forfeited his water rights because he did not water his entire place of use.”  
Respondent’s Br. at 18.  However, Sagewillow and other Idaho case law on this issue exists and is 
extremely persuasive.  This Court has explained that where a case “is controlling precedent in 
Idaho[,] the rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it 
has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.”  Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 
119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990).   
Contrary to Jackson’s representation that no such cases exists, and in addition to 
Sagewillow, there is an Idaho case that remains valid law, where this Court affirmed the 
forfeiture of a water right even though the evidence showed that the water user “was not able to 
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irrigate the entire property due to a combination of there not being enough water and because the 
equipment for irrigation was not in working order.”  McCray v. Rosenkrance, 135 Idaho 509, 512, 
20 P.3d 693, 696 (2001) (emphasis added).   
In McCray, the SRBA special master and the SRBA court concluded that “the water rights 
on the eastern portion of the property had been abandoned” but that “the water rights for the entire 
property had been forfeited due to nonuse” with the exception of a single 25-acre portion that had 
been irrigated.  Id. at 513, 20 P.3d at 697.  The water user raised the defense, now codified in Idaho 
Code § 42-223(6), that the nonuse was caused by “factors beyond his control.”  Id. at 516, 20 P.3d 
at 700.  Specifically, the facts showed that the water user “tried to irrigate more than the 25 acres 
in 1990, but was prevented from doing so because of drought and/or the wrongful actions of the 
watermaster.”  Id.  Additionally—and critically—there was also evidence that no irrigation system 
was in place to irrigate the water right’s entire place of use, this Court affirmed the finding of 
forfeiture based on evidence showing that “even if [the watermaster] had not terminated the flow 
[of water] to the property, the property still could not have been irrigated because of the lack of 
ability to water the property.”  Id. at 517, 20 P.3d at 701.  Thus, the lack of adequate water and the 
lack of an irrigation system—circumstances that were asserted to be beyond the control of the 
water right holder—were not adequate bases to prevent forfeiture.  Id.   
Here, as a matter of law, 40% of the water in Spring Creek was always available to the 
Jackson Property (and at times, 100% would have been available) because of the water right 
appurtenant to the property.  That appurtenance existed before and after the Jackson Property was 
sold to Jackson.  The fact that Jackson contends that his use of 40% of the Spring Creek flows is 
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a full resumption of his right is a tacit acknowledgement of that fact.  If, in Jackson’s view, using 
40% of the water now constitutes a full use of the appurtenant water right, why is the failure to use 
40% of the water by Bloxham on the Jackson Property anything other than a partial forfeiture?  
Bloxham’s (and/or the bankruptcy trustee’s) use of the water for the Jackson Property could have 
taken many forms: e.g., spreading the water over the full acreage of the property, using the water 
right to irrigate portions of the Jackson Property one section at a time every five years, or applying 
to IDWR for an extension of the forfeiture period.  See Idaho Code § 42-222(4) (explaining that 
upon a showing of reasonable cause, the Director may grant one extension of five years in which 
to resume use of a water right).  Bloxham took none of these actions, and thus forfeited the portion 
of 29-10420 appurtenant to the Jackson Property (which is now numbered as 29-14032).   
Further, to whatever extent actual availability is significant, McCray is both instructive and 
controlling.  McCray has not proved unjust or unwise in the past 16 years.  It remains binding on 
this Court and should not be overruled now.  The Jackson Property was not irrigated during the 
five-year period from 2004-2009.  R. at 60-61, 139-40.  While the evidence shows that there were 
times when there was not enough water to fully supply 29-10420’s authorized diversion rate during 
that time period, R. at 61, the evidence also shows that the Jackson Property “still could not have 
been irrigated because of the lack of ability to water the property.”  McCray, 119 Idaho at 517, 
20 P.3d at 701 (emphasis added).  The infrastructure to water the Jackson Property—which was 
absolutely in the water user’s control—did not exist to irrigate the Jackson Property.  R. at 60.  
Otherwise, there would be no need for Jackson to construct his own irrigation system, with the 
partial funding assistance of the Natural Resources Conservation Service (the “NRCS”), a division 
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of the United States Department of Agriculture.  R. at 210.  Thus, while the actual availability of 
water did not fully supply 29-10420, Bloxham had no way to irrigate the Jackson Property 
regardless of the water level.  As in McCray, the lack of infrastructure is within the water user’s 
control and means that a water right can be forfeited regardless of the actual availability of water.  
That should be the result here. 
The rule that should come out of this case is in keeping with Sagewillow and McCray.  
When water that is available—i.e., is in priority and may be diverted to irrigate the appurtenant 
acres—to a water right holder, who leaves the water unused for five or more consecutive years, 
the water right is forfeited (subject to resumption of use and claims of right, discussed below).  
Jackson proposes a rule that for as long as water is not fully available for diversion under a water 
right is not fully satisfied—no matter how small in magnitude—absolutely no portion of that water 
right can be forfeited.  This does nothing to encourage the efficient use of water, which is a key 
purpose of allowing forfeiture to extinguish unused water rights or relic water rights.  Hagerman 
Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho at 735, 947 P.2d at 408 (“The water of this arid state is an 
important resource. … Idahoans must make the most efficient use of this limited resource.  The 
policy of the law of this [s]tate is to secure the maximum use and benefit … of its water resources. 
… Integral to the goal of securing maximum use and benefit of our natural water resources is that 
water be put to beneficial use. … Partial forfeiture make possible allocation of water consistent 
with beneficial use concepts”).  Allowing forfeiture when legally available water goes unused for 
five consecutive years furthers the overall maximum use and benefit of water. 
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As to any exception or forfeiture defense raise by Jackson, there is no genuine issue of fact 
regarding any basis to deny that 29-14032 was forfeited by 2009.  The only remaining question is 
whether beneficial use of 29-14032 was resumed before a third party asserted a claim of right. 
C. Beneficial use of 29-14032 was not resumed before other water users made a claim of 
right on its water. 
The final part of the forfeiture analysis relates to whether Jackson resumed (partial or 
complete) use of 29-14032 prior to a claim of right made by a third party.  Sagewillow, 138 Idaho 
at 836, 70 P.3d at 674 (quoting Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 531-32, 147 P.2d 1009, 
1011 (1944)).  This Court has explained:  
A third party has made a claim of right to the water if [1] the third party has 
either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or [2] has obtained a 
valid water right authorizing the use of such water with a priority date prior 
to the resumption of use, or [3] has used the water pursuant to an existing 
water right. 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (internal citations omitted).  With particular reference 
to the second and third methods of making a claim of right:  
Prior to diversion, the water obviously cannot be identified as being the 
water entitled to be used by any particular appropriator. Whether or not a 
third party has made a claim to the water will usually depend upon evidence 
showing that the water source was overappropriated and, because of nonuse 
of water by the senior appropriator, water was available for use and used to 
fill junior water rights, or by evidence showing that resumption of use by 
the senior appropriator would diminish the quantity of water being used by 
junior appropriators from an interconnected water source. 
Id. at 842, n. 3, 70 P.3d at 680, n. 3.   
Here, there are issues relating to (1) whether Bloxham’s use of his water right to irrigate 
the Barnes Property constitutes a claim of right by a third party; and (2) if Bloxham’s use was not 
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a claim of right, the amount of Jackson’s resumption of use of 29-14032 prior to the institution of 
this action in August 2014. 
1. The Barneses are entitled to assert the claim of right made against 29-14032 in 2012 
by their predecessor-in-interest, Bloxham.  
Jackson claims that it is “circular logic” for the Barneses to assert that Bloxham could 
partially forfeit the water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property by nonuse and could later be a 
third party able to assert a claim of right against that forfeited water right.  Respondent’s Br. at 27.  
It appears that the concept that one person—Bloxham—could fill more than one role over the 
course of a forfeiture has stymied Jackson.  Respondent’s Br. at 29 (the Barneses “urge[] this Court 
to treat [Bloxham] as the owner of the water right able to forfeit the right … but to also treat him 
as a junior water right holder in relationship to Jackson … so that he could prevent Jackson’s 
resumption of use”); Respondent’s Br. at 30 (focusing on the status of being “junior” or “senior” 
and concluding that Sagewillow cannot apply).  Jackson goes so far as to call this “legal tap 
dancing” and “legal gymnastics.”  Respondent’s Br. at 4.   
The Barneses detailed and thoughtful analysis is not tap dancing or gymnastics.  This Court 
should not be persuaded by Jackson’s oversimplification and confusion.  There is, actually, no 
contradiction or need for confusion.  Two principles clarify Jackson’s misperception.   
First, when dealing with property matters, it is not uncommon for a single party to be in 
various roles over the course of time.  Jackson points out that “Bloxham could not be a third party 
in interest to his own property.”  Respondent’s Br. at 4.  This is true—Bloxham cannot own the 
property and be a third party while we owned the property.  However, once Bloxham no longer 
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owned the Jackson Property, then by definition he is a third party relative to the Jackson Property.  
Thus, through the passage of time, Bloxham was, first, an owner of the Jackson Property able to 
forfeit the thereunto appurtenant water right by nonuse and then, second (after the Jackson Property 
was no longer Bloxham’s), a third party relative to the Jackson property able to assert a claim of 
right against the forfeited water right.  The key point in time is April 26, 2012, when Jackson 
bought the Jackson Property.  Before then, Bloxham was the owner of the Jackson Property 
(subject to the control of the bankruptcy trustee during the bankruptcy) and forfeited the 
appurtenant water right.  After then, Bloxham was no longer the owner of the Jackson Property, 
but was a third party capable of asserting a claim of right sufficient to bar Jackson’s resumption of 
use.   
To use another analogy, these facts are like watching someone throw a ball in the air and 
then catch it.  Jackson’s under-analyzed view is like taking a photograph and not understanding 
how the same person can both throw and catch the ball.  The better approach is to watch a video 
that will show how one person can perform two seemingly contradictory actions over the course 
of time.   
Second, as to the issues regarding junior and senior water rights, the answer is simply that 
both policies are addressed by the fact that 29-14032 is neither junior nor senior to the rest of the 
rights descending from 29-10420—they all have an identical priority dates and each is affected by 
the operation of the others.  While Jackson recognizes the identical priority dates, he uses it to 
contend that because “Bloxham was not a junior water rights holder” to Jackson, he was not able 
to “protect his water use based on forfeiture under [Sagewillow]” (i.e., by making a claim of right).  
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Respondent’s Br. at 30.  This ignores the obvious corollary that the exercise of one water right 
with an identical priority date affects the availability of water as to other water rights with the same 
priority date.  This Court explained: 
once a water user's rights have been forfeited by nonuse, allowing the water 
right to be reinstated through a transfer proceeding would harm junior 
appropriators because once there was a forfeiture the junior 
appropriators moved up the ladder in priority. As this Court stated in 
Jenkins, “Priority in time is an essential part of western water law and 
to diminish one's priority works an undeniable injury to that water 
right holder.” 103 Idaho at 388, 647 P.2d at 1260. 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 837, 70 P.3d at 675 (emphasis added).  While this statement, like 
Jackson’s argument, is couched in terms of junior and senior, the broader principle is that a 
diminishment of a water right’s priority “works an undeniable injury to that water right holder.”  
Id. (quoting Jenkins, 103 Idaho at 388, 647 P.2d at 1260).  Sharing an equal priority date with 
another water right (and apportioning water on a pro rata basis) is clearly inferior to holding a 
priority date alone upon the forfeiture of the other water right.  In other words, in this situation, 
being the only water right on a given ladder rung is superior to sharing a rung.   
A claim of right may be asserted by a “third party” who “has used the [forfeited] water 
pursuant to an existing water right.”  Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680.  A claim of 
right made by a third party in this way depends on (a) “evidence showing that the water source 
was overappropriated and, because of nonuse of water by the [forfeited] senior appropriator, was 
available for use and used to fill junior water rights” asserting the claim of right; or (b) “evidence 
showing that resumption of use by the senior appropriator would diminish the quantity of water 
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being used by junior appropriators [asserting the claim of right] from an interconnected water 
source.”  Id. at 842, n. 3, 70 P.3d at 680, n. 3.   
By April 26, 2012, when Jackson purchased the Jackson Property, Bloxham (the Barneses’ 
predecessor-in-interest on the Barnes Property) was a third party relative to the Jackson Property.  
Spring Creek is over-appropriated.  R. at 177 (Jackson’s deposition testimony at 117:4-19, 
showing that there is not enough water to satisfy all water rights on Springs Creek); see also R. at 
61 (Bloxham Affidavit, ¶ 19, stating that “[t]here is typically not enough water to supply all of the 
water rights on the system” even without Jackson resuming use of 29-14032).  It is uncontested 
that the Barneses and other Spring Creek water users will suffer from diminished quantities of 
water if Jackson resumes use of 29-14032.  R. at 177 (Jackson’s deposition testimony at 117:16-
19: “Q. So if you stopped irrigating, that water would be used and relied upon by Barnes and other 
users that have water rights on Spring Creek?  A. Yep.”); see R. at 60-61 (Bloxham Affidavit, ¶¶ 
17-19).  Thus, during the irrigation season of 2012, when Bloxham continued irrigating the Barnes 
Property with as much water as was available to him in Spring Creek,8 Bloxham asserted a claim 
of right to the water forfeited from the Jackson Property.  Bloxham’s claim of right forecloses any 
of Jackson’s attempts to resume use of 29-14032. 
                                                 
8  Jackson claims, without any citation to the record, that “[t]here are disputes of fact related to whether Bloxham 
irrigated the property that became the Barnes’ [sic] and to what extend he irrigated that property.”  Respondent’s 
Br. at 30.  This appears to relate to Jackson’s counterclaim, which was dismissed by the District Court, R. at 361, 
363, and not appealed by Jackson.  Thus, this point is a non-issue, and is a distraction from the relevant matter of 
the forfeiture analysis. 
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2. The Barneses made their own claim of right by filing this suit, which limits the resumed 
use of 29-14032 to what Jackson beneficially used in 2012 and 2013.  
In the event that the Court, for any reason, does not consider Bloxham to have asserted a 
claim of right against 29-14032 in 2012, the institution of this action by the Barneses constitutes a 
per se claim of right that prevents any resumption or further resumption of use by Jackson.  See 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680.  Thus, any resumption of use of 29-14032 after 
August 29, 2014 (which includes all of Jackson’s irrigation in 2014), is ineffective.  R. at 7.   
For that reason, Jackson claims that he “partially resumed the water use on [the Jackson 
Property] in 2012, and that he fully resumed the water use on [the Jackson Property] in 2013,” and 
even ascribes this finding to the District Court—without any citation to the record.  Respondent’s 
Br. at 26.  It is important to note that the District Court did not find that Jackson fully resumed use 
of 29-14032 in 2013, but based its decision on the notion that the forfeiture period “could not have 
begun until Jackson bought the property in 2012” and that Jackson “used his right in 2012 prior to 
[the Barneses] filing this litigation.”  R. at 360.  This conclusion was not disturbed on 
reconsideration.  See R. at 466-68.  The District Court did not consider partial resumption of use, 
but erroneously considered any resumption (even the mere 3% of what would typically irrigate 
one acre of farmland Jackson used in 2012, Appellants’ Br. at 38) to be a full resumption of use.  
This Court can correct that error of law.   
In 2012, Jackson used at most a total of 0.092 acre feet on the Jackson Property.  
Appellants’ Br. at 38.  Such an unappreciable amount of use is de minimis and cannot constitute 
even a valid partial resumption of use of 29-14032.   
APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF—PAGE 31 
In 2013, Jackson claims he irrigated some 10 acres of the Jackson Property.  R. at 194. 
However, Jackson attacks this summary with only an incomplete citation to the record, claiming 
that the Barneses “ignore[] the fuller deposition and affidavit testimony that fully explained it.  (R.   
) [sic].”  Respondent’s Br. at 26.  Simply, there is no context that provides further relevant 
explanation.   
These are facts viewed in the light most favorable to Jackson, as is appropriate for 
consideration on a motion for summary judgment.  However, they are not uncontested.  The 
Barneses have provided testimony from two individuals—Bloxham, R. at 60-61, and Roy Calvin 
Henderson, R. at 139-40—that Jackson had not used 29-14032 to irrigate any portion of the 
Jackson Property through 2014.  Jackson claims he has done so and also challenges the credibility 
of Bloxham.  Respondent’s Br. at 26.  Further, Jackson attempts, without citation to the record, to 
introduce a new fact, claiming that Henderson’s view of the Jackson Property is obstructed.  
Respondent’s Br. at 26.   
The Barneses believe it is improper to consider witness credibility at summary judgment 
and to introduce new facts on appeal.  If the Court reaches this point of the analysis and finds that 
Bloxham’s 2012 use of water does not constitute a claim of right, these conflicts of material fact 
likely require denial of summary judgment and further proceedings to determine the facts of this 
case.  However, the Barneses invite this Court to consider that Jackson’s personal testimony—the 
only evidence he has provided of his 2012 and 2013 water use (which is contradicted by the 
statements of Bloxham and Henderson) is self-serving, uncorroborated, unsupported, and amounts 
to nothing more than a “scintilla of evidence” that is “insufficient to create a genuine issue of 
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material fact.”  Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op, Inc., 152 Idaho 632, 637, 272 P.3d 1263, 
1268 (2012) (citation omitted).  On that basis, this Court may reverse the District Court and grant 
summary judgment to the Barneses. 
IV. CONCLUSION. 
The key issues in this case turn on what “available” means and whether a former owner of 
property can assert a claim of right against the property’s appurtenant water right.  While the 
District Court made some other errors that warrant correction—e.g., considering irrigated acres as 
the measure of beneficial use of an agricultural irrigation water right, and distinguishing between 
partial and full resumption of use—the Court’s guidance in relation to forfeiture will be useful for 
water users, landowners, and IDWR.  Forfeiture will continue to be a rising issue as the SRBA 
fades into history, as water users participate in real estate transactions, and as water users deal with 
diminishing water supplies to meet current and future water demands—particularly on the Eastern 
Snake Plain Aquifer.  While in concept forfeiture may initially be viewed as harsh and even 
distasteful, it is necessary as it allows for the extinguishment of relic and/or unused water rights, 
the resurrection of which will disrupt the historic and reasonable expectations of water users on a 
particular water source.  The fine-tuned water distribution that users have come to expect and rely 
upon will always be under threat if a relic water right holder can assert years later that his use 
should resume again, despite reliance on the unused water by others.  
The examples of pivot corners and real estate development are two frequent instances 
where forfeiture will be an issue.  A circle pivot for a full 160-acre section, with a standard 
diversion rate of 3.2 cfs, will not (by itself) irrigate 28 acres of the 160—being 7 acres at each 
corner. The question frequently arises: if a farmer takes no action to water these pivot corners, are 
they forfeited? What if only 2.64 cfs Gust enough to irrigate 132 acres (160 minus 28) at a standard 
duty of water, being .02 cfs per acre) were available to the farmer? The farmer working with a 
developer poses another common situation. If a farmer has a full 40 acre quarter section, and 
decides to sell the 10 acres that he has not irrigated for many years because of difficulties in getting 
water there, is there any protection for his remaining rights on the 30 acres? Is the farmer unable 
to assert a claim ofright against the 10 acre parcel ' s (forfeited) water right? 
These situations are sure to occur, and reconfirmation from this Court of the principles of 
water right forfeiture law that remain in place will aid the water user community moving forward. 
The errors committed by the District Comt in this case, and advocated by Jackson, require this 
Court's correction and provide an opportunity for this Court to give guidance on the forfeiture 
doctrine. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i 4~ day of August, 2017. 
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